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“Cellular basis of consciousness”: Not just radical but wrong
Commentary on Reber on Origins of Mind

Brian Key
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Abstract: Reber (2016) attempts to resuscitate an obscure and outdated hypothesis referred
to as the “cellular basis of consciousness” that was originally formulated by the author nearly
twenty years ago. This hypothesis proposes that any organism with flexible cell walls, a
sensitivity to its surrounds, and the capacity for locomotion will possess the biological
foundations of mind and consciousness. Reber seeks to reduce consciousness to a
fundamental property inherent to individual cells rather than to centralised nervous systems.
This commentary shows how this hypothesis is based on supposition, false premises and a
misunderstanding of evolutionary theory. The cellular basis of consciousness hypothesis has
little explanatory and predictive power with regards to subjective experience.
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Reber (2016) proposes that “any organism with flexible cell walls, a sensitivity to its
surrounds and the capacity for locomotion will possess the biological foundations of mind
and consciousness.” Although he provides no evidence for his belief that organisms “have
minds because minds are an inherent component of organic form,” Reber is at least upfront
in declaring his power to decide which organic matter can be conscious (plants and fungi are
excluded). Reber proposes that the standard explanations of the role of neural tissue in
subjective experience are flawed because they depend on a “miracle” to bring forth
consciousness. He believes that because the neural basis of subjective experience is not
understood, a “miracle” must be needed to explain it. This conclusion is unreasonable. For
example, from the fact that the structure of DNA was unknown before 1953 it does not
follow that explanations of DNA structure relied on a miracle before that time. The unknown
should not be equated with the need for some miracle. Interestingly, having raised the
notion that scientific approaches to subjective experience were dependent on a miracle,
Reber admits that his own hypothesis relies on a miracle since he gets to choose which types
of organic matter can be conscious (but he justifies this as just a little miracle).
Reber arrives at his so-called solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness by
appealing to the idea that the emergence of subjective experience must conform to
evolutionary principles (at least, as he understands them). He stresses that significant
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functions, such as subjective experience could not possibly arise suddenly and mysteriously
only in humans because evolution progresses slowly over time. On this basis he believes that
a form of subjective experience emerged early in the timeline of human evolution and was
subsequently and progressively modified to become more complex and powerful. Post-hoc
reasoning can sometimes be correct when dealing with an entity that is concrete in form and
unambiguously identified in all animals, such as the nucleus. However, when a function such
as subjective experience arises late in the timeline of human evolution and is also not easily
observed or quantified, this reasoning fails. In the latter case what is needed is an
independent marker of subjective experience to reveal its presence in close and distantly
related species (Key, 2015; Key, 2016). Reber mistakenly chooses his own unsubstantiated
markers of “flexible cell walls, a sensitivity to its surrounds and the capacity for locomotion.”
Reber does not appreciate that novel and significant form and function can emerge
any time during evolution through genetic modifications. Precusors or rudimentary versions
of these characteristics do not need to have existed in earlier common ancestors. One
example is gene duplication; it enables genes to take on new and innovative functions not
shared by early organisms. EvoDevo abounds with examples of the emergence and spread of
novelty (genetic and phenotypic) in animal populations (Peterson, 2016).
What most people will find difficult to accept is that Reber’s hypothesis extends
beyond animals with nervous systems to single cell organisms. While there is nothing unique
in proposing that only animals have the capacity for subjective experience, it is rather a long
bow to draw to suggest that organisms without a nervous system possess subjective
awareness (unless the definition of subjective experience is radically changed to remove its
subjective nature). The power of any good hypothesis is revealed by its ability to (i) make
new predictions that are experimentally testable and capable of advancing knowledge, and
(ii) explain existing knowledge and future observations. Unfortunately, Reber’s hypothesis
fails on both accounts with respect to subjective experience. What we are presented with is
a weak hypothesis with little explanatory or predictive power.
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